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ABSTRACT 
The increasing use of web services, the proved advantages of service-oriented architectures and continuously applied 
attacks to them require utilization of given secure mechanisms that ensure the security at different levels. The aim of the 
paper is to summarize the existing threats and attacks to web applications and web services. Contemporary security 
standards and good practices describing methods and contrivance for deciding security problems are explored too to 
reveal the present state in the field. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Development and usage of web applications and services is a sector in continuous growth with focus on social, financial, 
enterprise, mapping, ecommerce, government, science, messaging, payment and other fields. BBC reports on increase in 
demand for Amazon web services in the field of cloud computing, hosting, searching, analysis, storing, etc. [1]. Public 
available web services are listed in registers or directly on the providers‟ web sites like: XMethods [2], Membrane directory  
for public SOAP web services [3], Workday SOAP Web Services Directory [4], USGS site for SOAP and REST web 
services [5], etc. This wide use of web services via Internet and realization of service-oriented architectures in 
organizations requires adhering to secure issues ensuring their correct utilization and the achievement of the right effects 
to the end users. So, the design and development of secure web services is related to deciding a set of problems – 
several of them are “standard” and well described in the literature and security specifications/standards, others are unique 
for the concrete architecture and solution. Building secure web services requires observance of a number of steps: (1) 
identification and description of the security objectives; (2) understanding the use of web service in particular scenarios 
and context and related to that possible threats, attacks and vulnerabilities; (3) studying and applying the best practices, 
proven principles and patterns avoiding risks factors in security implementation; (4) choosing effective security engineering 
process based on specific activities ensuring the realization of the security objectives [6]. 
Web services are defined as software systems that perform interoperable machine-to-machine communication through 
network [7]. The main characteristics of web services, ensuring interoperability are described via Web Services 
Architecture (WSA) [7]. The WSA consists of four models representing through concepts different aspects of web services 
as it is shown in Table 1. WSA identifies three concepts revealing the security issues of web services: resources (anything 
that has an URI; web services are a kind of resource), mechanisms for securing the web services and policies (documents 
that describe resource constrains and that are prepared for machine processing). Also, the WSA summarizes the security 
requirements that should be taken into considerations at the web services implementation (Figure 1).  
Table 1. Main characteristics of web services via models 
Model Focus Concepts Security concepts 
Service oriented Action  Service is realized by agent 1 
 Service is used by agent 2 
 Messaging between agent 1 and 
agent 2 
 Usage of meta-data 
 
Message oriented Message  Messages 
 Message structure 
 Message transport 
 Message Layer Security 
Resource oriented Resource  Representation 
 URI 
 Ownership by organization or 
person  
 Resources security 
Policy Policy  Policy about resource 
 Policy about action 
 Policy applied to agents 
 Established by organization or 
person 
 Security mechanisms 
 Policies 
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Fig 1: Security requirements to web services 
Interface design is the main criterion that forms two groups of web services: (1) SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol)- 
and WSDL (Web Service Definition Language)-based web services and (2) RESTful (REST - Representational State 
Transfer) web services. The differences in these two groups of web services lead to several specific characteristics 
concerning security issues.  
The aim of the paper is to summarize the current state related to web services‟ security covering common threats and 
attacks at application level as well as to identify specific security points typical for SOAP-based and RESTful web services. 
It includes an examination of existing security specifications/standards and exploration of good practices in realization of 
security web services.   
Web Services Vulnerabilities, Threats and Attacks 
Vulnerabilities, threats and attacks to web services include all activities of the attacker against network infrastructure, web 
applications and host computers as well as all activities of designers/developers (during design/development process of 
web applications/web services) and administrators (during administration). Threats and attacks at application level are 
organized in several categories for their better understanding and analysis. Two classifications according to Microsoft 
Corporation [8] and Web Application Security Consortium [9] are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Threats and attacks against web applications 
Attack category Microsoft Corporation [8] Web Application Security Consortium [9] 
Authentication network eavesdropping 
brute force attacks 
dictionary attacks 
cookie replay 
credential theft 
brute force  
insufficient authentication 
weak password recovery validation 
Authorization elevation of privilege 
disclosure of confidential data 
data tampering 
luring attacks 
credential/session prediction 
insufficient authorization  
insufficient session expiration 
session fixation 
Input validation buffer overflow 
cross-site scripting 
SQL injection 
canonicalization 
 
Session management session hijacking 
session replay 
man in the middle 
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Authentication password limit number of attempts certificates in combination 
with Kerberos, 
PKI, LDAP, etc. 
Authorization access control roles, privileges 
 
Data and 
message 
integrity and 
confidentiality 
encryption digital signatures 
Audit trails audit guard monitor, trace 
Security Policy 
Enforcement 
permission policy obligatory policy permission guard audit guard 
Integrity of 
transactions  
Non-repudiation 
point-to-point end-to-end 
occurance of transaction 
execution of transaction 
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Parameter 
manipulation 
cookie manipulation 
form field manipulation 
HTTP header manipulation 
 
Cryptography poor key generation or key management 
weak encryption 
 
Sensitive data network eavesdropping 
data tampering 
 
Configuration 
management 
unauthorized access to administration interfaces 
unauthorized access to configuration stores  
retrieval of clear text configuration data 
 
Exception 
management 
information disclosure 
denial of service 
 
Auditing and logging user denies performing an operation 
attacker exploits an application without trace  
attacker covers his tracks 
 
Client-side Attacks  content spoofing  
cross-site scripting 
Command Execution  buffer overflow  
format string attack  
LDAP Injection  
OS Commanding  
SQL Injection 
SSI Injection  
XPath Injection 
Information Disclosure  directory indexing  
information leakage  
path traversal  
predictable resource location 
Logical Attacks  abuse of functionality  
denial of service  
insufficient anti-automation  
insufficient process validation 
 
Anyway, according to a statistical analysis, published at the web site of Web Application Security Consortium, the most 
applied vulnerabilities and attacks to web applications are: Cross-Site Scripting, Information Leakage, SQL Injection, 
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection, Fingerprinting and HTTP Response Splitting [10]. The experts reveal that the 
reasons for Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection and HTTP Response Splitting vulnerabilities are obligated to designers 
and developers of web services and the rest vulnerabilities are mistakes performed by administrators. Another statistic 
analysis of WhiteHat Security company reports that the most common vulnerabilities and attacks typical for web 
applications are Cross-Site Scripting, Information Leakage, Content Spoofing, SQL Injection, Cross-Site Request Forgery, 
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection, Abuse of Functionality, HTTP Response Splitting, Predictable Resource Location, 
Brute Force [11]. The analysis shows a dependence between the appeared vulnerabilities and used technologies for 
realization of web applications. The contemporary picture explaining the most utilized threats and attacks to web 
applications and web services are presented on Figure 2.  
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Fig.2: Contemporary threats and attacks 
In this section many of the common threats and attacks to web applications and web services are described and solutions 
for different security problems proposed by the scientific society are discussed. 
 Cross-site scripting (XSS) 
An attacker could put executable code (for example JavaScript) in a data stream and the victim‟s web browser will execute 
it. Then the attacker will take private information and privileges. Two types of XSS attacks are defined: reflected (non-
persistent) and stored (persistent) [12]. In the reflected XSS attack, the attacker prepares a special link that will direct the 
victim to the vulnerable web server. Clicking on the link, the executable code is ran in the victim‟s web browser. In the 
stored attack, the executable code is embedded in an HTML page or other data that are stored on the vulnerable web 
server. Then everybody who opens this contagious web page will run the executable code in the browser. Experts suggest 
several preventive measures to be taken: blocking the untrusted JavaScript code, using available possibilities in a browser 
for protection, disallowing external web sites to request internal resources, updating the used software and using a 
protective system against malware [12]. Kirda et al. have developed a client-side application Noxes to prevent XSS 
attacks [13]. It is built in a form of web firewall that is ran as background service and that alarms the victim for possible 
attacks. A survey describing existing vulnerable XSS web applications and current solutions divided in four categories 
(according to application location, type of analysis, method for detection and method for prevention) is proposed by 
Shanmugam and Ponnavaikko [14]. 
 SQL Injection 
This is one of the most common method for attacking a web service. Malicious SQL code is placed in parameter field and 
is sent to the server that will execute it. SQL statement is created or modified in a false way by the attacker and in this way 
he will have access to the database and information revealing given privileges. Laranjeiro et al. propose a solution to 
secure web services against SQL and XPath injection attacks [15]. The solution consists of three phases: service 
assessment, statement learning and service protection. The performed experiment shows 100% effectiveness against all 
SQL and XPath injection attacks. Another approach for prevention against SQL injection attack is presented in [16]. It is 
called SQLDOM4J and it is created for Java online applications. SQLDOM4J builds and executes SQL queries protecting 
web applications and services. The authors recommend eight techniques for prevention.  
 Buffer Overflows 
The attacker writes more data in one or several fields causing buffer overflows and memory overfilling. This can lead to 
crash of the service, software or system. This attack allows gaining access to unauthorized information or unauthorized 
execution of processes Two types of buffer overflow are most common: Stack-Based Overflow and Heap-Based Overflow 
[17].  
 Brute Force Attack 
Every web application that requires user authentication through username and password could be a target of brute force 
attack. The attacker tries different combinations of values to guess the password and to gain access to the 
application/system. This attack is not hard for detection, but it is difficult for prevention and protection. Login attempts with 
different passwords for a short time should be limited and after a given number of attempts should be blocked. The 
password should be strong with different character types. Usage of encryption algorithms will decrease the attacker 
possibilities for reaching needed data. Adams et al. divide the brute force attacks in four types: “targeted attack” - the 
attacker tries to guess the user password and the success depends on the password strength; “trawling attack” - the 
attacker uses combination of characters for a password and tries it to find a user account with this password; “blind” attack 
– the attacker is looking for both in parallel: username and password applying a heuristic strategy or just applies a strategy 
of methodically attempts; “knowledge question” – it is a strategy that proposes a user possibility to answer a secure 
question when he has forgot his username or password [18]. The authors propose a security mechanism based of three 
Input validation 
Client-side Attacks 
 
 Authentication 
Sensitive data 
Information 
Disclosure 
Transport layer 
Parameter 
manipulation 
Content Spoofing 
Brute force 
Cross-site scripting SQL Injection 
Predictable resource location 
Fingerprints 
Information Leakage 
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 
HTTP Response Splitting 
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different ideas: decoupling protection and authentication activities; recognition of attacks directions and defense of the 
correct directions, not at all simultaneously; creation of a sliding window along each direction – when the number of 
attempts in this window reaches a given value then a defence measure will be taken. 
 Dictionary Attack 
Through a dictionary attack the attacker utilizes a set of methods for gaining access to a target system. He uses all strings 
in a list like all words in a dictionary. So, this attack is more focused than brute force attack and it could be done in shorter 
time. It includes encryption of a cryptograph algorithm and breaking an authentication mechanism, receiving the cipher key 
or passwords/usernames. Pinkas and Sander talk about RTT (Reverse Turing Test) protocol for securing passwords from 
a Dictionary attack [19]. They discuss its scalability, usability and security issues and show that the RTT authentication 
scheme is easy for implementation even for service providers plus the fact that it is not very costly. A modification of the 
RTT protocol called history-based protocol with RTTs is presented by Stubblebine and Oorschot [20]. The research team 
argues that this new protocol improves security against Dictionary attack, usability and parameter flexibility. Anyway, they 
suggest that this protocol is not enough for securing web applications – it needs a combination of RTT and additional 
techniques like: notifications of failed logins, solving the problem of consuming client resources by clients and returning 
verification of a login, RTT with an embedded warning instructing the user to not give an answer to RTT when the match is 
failed.    
 Cookie replay attacks 
The attacker uses a previously valid cookie deluding the server that this session is still in progress and active. He hijacks a 
session token and utilizes it to replay to application. Then attacker gains access to the application under a false identity. 
The Cookie replay attack could be prevented by the following countermeasures: ensuring of encrypted communication 
SSL channel at transferring of authentication cookies [21], usage of session timeout that will decrease the time interval for 
reply attacks performed by the attacker, through technique token regeneration [22]. 
 Network Eavesdropping 
The attacker monitors the network packets, reads information searching for sensitive data (clear text passwords) or 
configuration information. This attack is known also under name sniffing [23]. The important information that is traveling via 
a network could be protected through: (1) encryption on transport level using SSL or IPSec in the case when the 
administrator controls sender and receiver points; (2) encryption of messages transferring among intermediary network 
points. Adida proposes a method SessionLock to ensure the security of web sessions against the network eavesdropping 
attack without the utilization of SSL [24]. A session secret is generated for usage by browsers and an authentication code 
for every HTTP request is created. Then the connection between HTTPS and HTTP is protected. 
 Credential Theft 
The attacker has the possibility to steal stored/cashed usernames and passwords – information that is required for login. 
Preventing countermeasures could be: usage of a strong password, block many attempts at login, verification of stored 
password, available option for user to choose or not the cashing of credentials [25]. 
 
 Data tampering 
Data tampering is related to unauthorized modification of data on the network and in the storage. Prevention could be 
realized through: (1) ensuring strong control over access to data storage – just for authorized users; (2) ensuring of 
different privileges for users who can view and modify data. Pavlou and Snodgrass propose a method for detection of data 
tampering using cryptographic hash functions [26]. Forensic analysis is performed revealing when, how and by who the 
data tampering is done.  
 Elevation of privilege 
The attacker with low level privileges elevates his privileges at higher level taking control over accounts, processes and 
services. It is talking about vertical elevation – elevation from lower privileges to higher ones and horizontal elevation – 
gaining access to accounts with similar privileges. Countermeasures consists of returning the last privileged state, 
including accounts, processes and services [27].  
 Disclosure of confidential data 
Confidential data (identity, sensitive data, configuration data, system data) could be exposed in unwilling form and seen by 
unprivileged entities. Prevention includes ensuring secure storage and a secure transmission channel via the network. 
Software developers should remove any bugs leading to the disclosure of confidential data. One solution ensuring trusted 
middleware is called SaveWeb and is proposed by Hosek and al. [28]. Security labels are associated with transmitted and 
stored data and their statement is transparently tracked. 
 Man-in-the-middle 
The attacker intercepts a communication channel between client and server and interacts between them. He reads and 
probably modifies data with aim to perform other kind of attacks. Eriksson demonstrates in his research an easy way for 
creation of tool for performing a man-in-the-middle attack against server authenticated SSL sessions just through usage of 
existing programming libraries [29]. He suggests that the defence against such attacks includes: two-way trust relationship 
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between client and server during communication period and user‟s intentions to be signed. Another author Gangan in his 
review concludes that the man-in-the-middle-attack cannot be completely removed, but several security measures could 
be taken like: network software update, creation of secure network design, continues update of computer software [30]. 
 Cookie manipulation 
Cookies store information about user preferences and about the realized session. Also, the cookies could be modified at 
the client side by the attacker and then they could be sent to a server. It helps the attacker to authenticate his false identity 
accessing the web service or web site. Several mitigation techniques are presented in [31]: user authentication through a 
session token, evaluation of cookies for false combination of values that identify tampering, cookies encryption to prevent 
tampering. 
 Denial of service (DoS) 
This is a process for network flooding, creating a high volume of traffic, then all network resources are consumed and web 
application is unavailable for use. The final goal is disruption of service. Distributed Denial of service attack (DDoS) is 
based on collaborative work of many computers for coordination of one DoS attack against one or more targets. DDoS 
attack addressing a web site is performed by flooding web servers with so many requests and as a result the web site is 
getting unavailable for use. For this attack there is no sufficient protection. Kargl et al. describe DoS and DDoS attacks 
classification, grouping them in three categories: “system attacked” – the target of the attacker is a system – this could be 
a web server clients, routers, a firewall system, a load-balancer, individual web servers, database servers; “part of the 
system attacked” – hardware of a given system, operating system, TCP/IP flow, router, web server, database server, 
scripts; “bug or overload” – DoS could be caused from an application bug or overload of components [32]. The authors 
propose a solution applying strategies related to the routing, based on classes and active monitoring of traffic. 
 Spoofing 
The attacker could use a false identity through stolen credentials of a user or false IP address to receive the system 
access. A misuse pattern of Spoofing web services is presented in [33]. This pattern explains how a false identity can be 
created, how the attack is started and how it can be stopped.  
A testing tool WS-Attacker against specific attacks like WS-Addressing spoofing and SOAPAction spoofing is presented in 
[34]. The tool is evaluated utilizing four frameworks for deployment of web services: Apache Axis2, JBossWS native, 
JBossWS CXF and .NET Web Services and the results are promising. 
Another attack is visual spoofing – in this case the secure connection of a browser is replaced with a fake connection 
created by attacker. The victim who thinks that he is using a secure web site and services sends private information 
directly to the attacker. The visual spoofing attack is a typical threat to secure web services related to single sign on 
services, online banking and shopping [35]. An additional attack to visual spoofing is the so called mounting attack – the 
victim‟s browser is directed to a web site that hosts the visual spoofing attack. The proposed effective countermeasures 
against the visual spoofing attack include: training the victim to increase his security vigilance and technical measure 
including several issues – personalization at authentication of browser secure connection indicators, using additional 
application that reports information from trustfully source (like IP address of web server), using application that renders 
and analyses the code of a web site [35]. 
 Abuse of functionality 
The attacker takes advantages of the current functionality of a web application to attack this application or other. The 
result is information leaking, gaining access control or using resources. 
Web Services Security Specifications 
Specifications and standards concerning the security issues of web applications and web services are part of the working 
groups of World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
(OASIS). In this section the key specifications and standards concerning web services security are listed: 
 W3C XML Encryption Syntax and Processing – This specification describes a process for data encryption and 
examines the result presentation in XML format [36]. 
 W3C XML Signature Syntax and Processing – Specification provides description of syntax and rules for the creation 
of XML digital signature [37]. Digital signatures ensure integrity, message and signer authentication for any data 
inside a XML document. 
 W3C XML Key Management Specification – This specification describes protocols related to the distribution and 
registration of public keys [38] and W3C recommends it to be used in conjunction with specifications XML Encryption 
Syntax and Processing and XML Signature Syntax and Processing. 
 OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) – This is a XML-based framework aiming to standardize security 
assertions related to authentication, entitlement, and attribute information between XML services [39]. 
 OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) – This is a standard XML-based language that 
possesses possibilities to describe security policies [40]. Access control rules are standardized in XML format. 
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 OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security – This specification reveals the models for building secure 
web services (including using secure models like PKI, Kerberos, and SSL) achieving integrity and confidentiality of the 
message content [41]. 
 OASIS Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile – The specification presents X.509 certificate 
relationship with a public key and a set of attributes [42]. It specifies the methods for X.509 authentication framework 
and it is used together with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification. 
 OASIS Web Services Security Policy Language – It describes the set of policy assertions of web services in the form 
of constraints and requirements according to the security features proposed in specifications Web Services Security: 
SOAP Message Security, Web Services Trust Language and Web Services Secure Conversation Language [43]. 
 OASIS Web Services Trust Language – The specification is extension of the Web Services Security: SOAP Message 
Security and describes methods for designing of secure communication based on “trust” between the communicating 
parties [44]. 
 OASIS Web Services Secure Conversation Language – The specification is extension of the Web Services Security: 
SOAP Message Security specification and describes security contests and their application [45]. 
Security of  Technologies for implementation of Web Services  
Web services are developed upon well-known technologies like: XML, SOAP, WSDL, HTTP and utilization of  security 
issues of these technologies could support the process of web services securing.  
 Security of SOAP messages  
The security of SOAP messages can be done through security mechanisms applied to different communication layers as 
well as ensured through a combination of methods. The right configuration of the SOAP layer and transport layer is a very 
important part of a strategy for realization of security.  
Transport layer – This layer uses the SOAP messaging protocol to realize the transport of the messages. Security can be 
achieved through separate mechanisms applied to the transport layer or through a combination of mechanisms taking into 
considerations the security possibilities of a SOAP message. A security transport layer can ensure SOAP message 
integrity (integrity of the whole message, this mechanism cannot protect a part of the message), confidentiality (SSL/TLS 
defence depends on the used cryptograph algorithms and the key length), authentication (through certificate X.509, usage 
of digests). 
Layer SOAP message - Mechanisms can ensure the integrity of the message part or combination of different message 
parts (through XML digital signature). The integrity is guaranteed not only during HTTPS session, but also after that. 
Confidentiality is realized for parts of a SOAP message through XML digital signature. The confidentiality defence 
continues after the end of a session. 
Authentication of SOAP sender – The SOAP sender can propose authentication to one or more SOAP receivers through 
including one or more secure tokens in the head part of the SOAP messages. This security mechanism can be applied 
together with XML digital signature. 
 Security at XML level 
Security measures include defence of XML documents in their transmission from sender to the final destination passing 
them through several intermediary nodes. Different parts of one XML document can travel to different final destinations. 
So, every element and content of one XML document can be secured. The XML security is realized through technologies 
like: XML encryption and XML digital signature. XML security achieves the following: 
Confidentiality – Just the right receiver reads a given part of the XML document. It is achieved through usage of 
cryptograph algorithms (XML encryption standard). 
Integrity – It means that the XML is not modified during its transportation from sender to receiver. The integrity is 
guaranteed through usage of the standard XML digital signature. 
Authenticity – This mechanism ensures that the XML is sent by this person for whose he is presented. Confirmation of the 
sender identity can be realized through XML digital signature. The receiver can validate the sender‟s digital signature 
through usage of the sender‟s public key. If the digital signature is valid, then the identity is confirmed. 
Not-refuse – The sender cannot refuse the sent XML document. XML digital signature is generated through the private key 
of the sender and guarantee his identity.  
 Security on HTTP 
The security of HTTP is ensured through the cryptographic protocols SSL and TLS. SSL/TSL use X.509 certificate and 
asymmetric cryptograph algorithms for authentication on the opposite side in one communication. For encryption of the 
transmitted data between two sides a session key is used to guarantee integrity, confidentiality and authentication. 
 Security of RESTful web services 
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RESTful web services possess different design in comparison with SOAP web services and this fact leads to several 
differences in their securing. Anyway, all threats and attacks are applicable to web services in despite of their design 
nature.  Forsberg in his research work talks about the specific characteristics of RESTful web services and the problem of 
secure data caching [46]. He proposes a solution for the implementation of secure web services without the need to 
secure URLs. This increases the performance of the RESTful services and decreases the requirements about ensuring of 
secure data storages. Experts reveal that mechanisms and technologies like: HTTP authentication, SSL, XML Signature, 
XML Encryption, SAML, Cardspace, other could be applied for better securing of RESTful services [47]. A report of 
National Security Agency of USA describes the often applied threats and attacks to the RESTful web services: session 
hijacking, Cross-site scripting, SQL Injection, Format String, Inadequate authentication/authorization methods, Cross Site 
Request Forgery, Access control policies and also comments several protective and defensive techniques [48]. The report 
recommends that encryption is always used for data transfers. Two types of encryption should be applied: transport 
encryption (SLL/TSL) and data encryption (XML).  
Conclusion 
The paper presents the contemporary view about security issues concerning web applications and web services. 
Realization of secure web services is a complex topic and it depends on different stakeholders: software designers and 
developers, network/database administrators, the work and understanding of security department in an organization, 
security policy of organizations, organizations involved in creation of specifications and standards. The temp of emerging 
new threats and attacks depends on emerging new technologies and applications. Classifications of threats and attacks 
are created by experts for their better understanding and analysis. This review shows that scientific society proposes a 
wide variety of solutions for securing the web applications and web services. Based on different design, the SOAP and 
RESTful web services are characterized with several specific features related to their attacks and security. Table 3 
summarizes the reported attacks to SOAP and RESTful web services. The security issues in specifications and standards 
for SOAP web services are better developed in comparison with these concerning RESTful services. 
Table 3. Threats and attacks against SOAP and RESTful web services 
SOAP [10], [11] RESTful [48] 
Cross-Site Scripting 
SQL Injection 
Content Spoofing 
Information Leakage 
Abuse of Functionality  
Predictable Resource Location 
HTTP Response Splitting 
Fingerprinting  
Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 
Brute Force 
Cross-site scripting  
SQL Injection 
Cross Site Request Forgery 
Inadequate authentication/authorization methods 
Format String  
session hijacking 
Access control policies 
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